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Ronald Chestert and Robert Sacksteintt
"I leave this rule for others when I'm dead,
Be always sure you're right - THEN GO AHEAD!"
Colonel David Crockett
A NARRATIVE OF THE LIFE OF DAVID CROCKETT, OF THE
STATE OF TENNESSEE (1834).
ABSTRACT
The breakneck speed of scientific developments in embryonic
stem (ES) cell technologies is, commensurately, ushering forth new
bioethical debate(s) regarding these cells. A framework of bioethical
principles is presented here to guide biomedical scientists and others
engaged in improving human welfare through the application of ES
cell-based therapies.
INTRODUCTION: STEM CELL THERAPY
Stem cell-based regenerative therapy offers the prospect of restor-
ing functional integrity to damaged tissues and organs. There is great
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hope in the medical community that regenerative medicine will be-
come established clinical practice and will offer cures rather than
therapy for a multitude of debilitating and life-threatening conditions.
However, despite its profound potential to alleviate human suffering,
the use of embryonic stem (ES) cells for regenerative therapy has
raised considerable moral and ethical debate. At the forefront of the
concerns raised in this debate has been the notion that pluripotent' ES
cells can only be obtained from blastocysts, requiring the destruction
of viable embryos. Moreover, the possibility that reproductive clon-
ing could result from the creation of autologous2 embryonic stem cells
in vitro using somatic cell nuclear transfer (SCNT)3 has markedly
affected support among scientists and others for this approach. Nota-
bly, within the past few years, great strides have been made in devel-
oping techniques to create pluripotent ES-like cells without either
blastocyst production or disruption of embryos, thereby offering the
opportunity to circumvent these primary ethical and moral objections.
Still, any manipulation of a human cell to create ES-like cells is ex-
pected to raise controversy, especially since these cells may possess
the potential for developing into a human being.
Thus, though innovations in the creation of ES-like cells may
nullify present ethical concerns about creating embryos in order to
destroy them, these techniques and their product(s) may still generate
contentious debate. To most appropriately support the clinical use of
such advances, biomedical scientists must understand the various eth-
ical and moral perspectives that can dominate discussions for and
against any current and emerging stem cell technology. In this article,
we briefly review the most recent progress in ES cell technologies,
and frame a set of bioethical principles to guide deliberations on the
impact of these developments on human welfare. This bioethical
framework is certainly not the only one available, but we present it as
a practical, straightforward guide to determining what procedures
should be utilized in the stem cell field. To this end, we have tried to
Capable of differentiating into one of many cell types.
2 From the same organism.
In the SCNT process a nucleus from an adult differentiated somatic cell
(such as a skin cell) is removed and then fused with an enucleated egg to create a
single entity called a clone. The resulting clone carries the genetic material (DNA) of
the donor of the somatic cell, and a tiny portion of the mitochondrial DNA from the
donor of the egg cell. The clone is identical in essence to its somatic cell donor. See
Ronald Chester, Cloning Embryos from Adult Human Beings: The Merits of Repro-
ductive Research and Therapeutic Uses, 39 NEw ENG. L. REV. 583, 584 n.6 (2005)
(citing Ronald Chester, Cloning for Human Reproduction: One American Perspec-
tive, 23 SYDNEY L. REv. 319, 321-22 (2001)).
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focus on the fundamentals of what otherwise might become overly
complex and esoteric bioethical arguments.
I. RECENT PROGRESS IN DEVELOPMENT AND USE
OF ESC OR ES-LIKE CELLS
For the purpose of the ensuing bioethical discussion, it is impor-
tant to briefly review recent advances that enhance the efficiency and
safety of deriving pluripotent ESC or ES-like cells for regenerative
therapeutics. Presently, pluripotent cells (i.e. cells with the capacity to
develop into every cell of an adult animal) can be obtained in several
ways:
A. Retrieval of Cells from the Inner Cell Mass of
Embryonic Blastocysts
During the earliest development of the embryo, within a few days
of conception, dividing cells develop into a hollow cavity (the blasto-
cyst). Thereafter, cells inside the blastocyst continue to divide and
form a clump (the inner cell mass). Cells isolated from the inner cell
mass, are authentic "embryonic stem cells."
B. Somatic Cell Nuclear Transfer (SCNT)
This process is described in footnote 3, supra; it raises special
considerations because of the inherent capacity for reproductive clon-
ing if ES cells are derived from the cells that divide first (the blasto-
mere stage). Moreover, use of this technique is markedly limited -
practically and bioethically - by the need to obtain ova in metaphase
II from a healthy donor.4
C. Artificial Parthenogenesis by Blockage of the Second Meiotic
Division of the Oocyte
A primitive egg (a "germ cell") undergoes divisions to reduce the
number of genes to half the normal amount (a "haploid" cell), so that
donor sperm can contribute the other half of the genetic material to
make a whole genetic complement (a "diploid cell"). If the reduction
division is interrupted, the egg can be triggered into acting as if it is
4 See Andrew J. French et al., Development of Human Cloned Blastocysts
Following Somatic Cell Nuclear Transfer with Adult Fibroblasts, 26 STEM CELLS
485, 485 (2008).
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fertilized. Notably, this technology cannot yield an embryo capable of
fetal development without additional genetic manipulation.
D. Induced Pluripotent Stem (iPS) Cell by Ectopic Expression of
Defined Transcription Factors that Will Cause De-differentiation
("Reprogramming") of a Somatic Cell or an Adult Stem Ce116
All genes are regulated by small proteins called "transcription
factors." Some of the key transcription factors that turn on the genes
responsible for maintaining cells in the undifferentiated (stem) state
have been identified. If these transcription factors are introduced into
a mature adult (somatic) cell, they cause the cell to de-differentiate to
a more primitive state.
In general, all ESC and ES-like cells suffer from the potential to
grow without proper differentiation (dysregulated growth), manifest-
ing most commonly in complex tumor formation, but this problem
may be circumvented by driving differentiation of the cells into the
intended target cell type coupled with meticulous cell selection to
avoid genetic markers associated with pluripotence. 7 With iPS cells,
the potential for cancer transformation is compounded with the intro-
duction of cancer-producing transcription factors, usually proteins
(e.g., c-Myc), for reprogramming of the target cell, especially when
transcription factors are delivered using viruses (e.g., retroviral vec-
tors). Original reports for generating iPS cells used four transcription
factors for a somatic cell.8 Recent reports have shown that iPS cells
can be created with avoidance of c-Myc9 and with fewer transcription
5 See Tomohiro Kono et al., Birth ofParthenogenetic Mice that Can Devel-
op to Adulthood, 428 NATURE 860, 860 (2004).
6 Jeong Beom Kim et al., Oct4-induced Pluripotency in Adult Neural Stem
Cells, 136 CELL 411, 412 (2009). There is another possible technique whose impor-
tance has yet to be shown and thus will not be discussed in this article. Zouh et al.
reprogrammed a somatic cell that natively expressed complementing factors into
another cell type. This approach has been reported for pancreatic cells wherein exo-
crine aciner cells were created in vivo to endocrine Beta-cells. It apparently does not
require dedifferentiation, but involves "reprogramming" by introduction of three
genes whose expressions are typically restricted to embryonic cells.
7 Marius Wernig et al., Neurons Derived from Reprogrammed Fibroblasts
Functionally Integrate into the Fetal Brain and Improve Symptoms of Rats with Par-
kinson's Disease, 105 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. Sci. U.S. 5856, 5859-60 (2008).
Kazutoshi Takahashi et al., Induction of Pluripotent Stem Cells from Adult
Human Fibroblasts by Defined Factors, 131 CELL 861 (2007).
9 Masato Nakagawa et al., Generation of Induced Pluripotent Stem Cells
without Myc from Mouse and Human Fibroblasts, 26 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 101,
105 (2008).
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factors, particularly if the starting cell is favorable to reprogramming,
such as an adult stem cell.o Moreover, viral vectors" that do not
integrate into the genome, and other strategies that avoid viruses alto-
gether1 2 can be used to deliver relevant transcription factors, and
chemical agents may be capable of inducing changes in gene expres-
sion leading to reprogramming without need for c-Myc or other tran-
scription factors. 3
For use of blastocyst-derived ES cells, immune rejection of trans-
planted cells would be likely because disparities would exist between
donor and recipient tissue type. However, embryonic stem cells pos-
sess some inherent immune privilege'4 and immune rejection would
not be expected using cells from the same organism (e.g., ESC from
SCNT, ES-like cells from parthenogenesis or IPS cells).
II. BACKGROUND TO THE DEBATE: IS AN EMBRYO
A PERSON?
Other than possible carcinogenic effects and immune system re-
jection, the two biggest issues with regard to the four described tech-
niques seem to be: (1) destroying 4-6 day old human embryos to
obtain stem cells (Technique A); and even more controversial, (2)
whether SCNT should be used to create a cloned human embryo for
medical and other purposes (Technique B).' 5 Artificial parthenogene-
sis (Technique C) and the creation of iPS cells (Technique D) are too
new to have generated much debate, but assumedly would be less
controversial because they avoid destroying an embryo that might
develop into a human being.
10 See Kim et al., supra note 6, at 414.
" Matthias Stadtfeld et al., Induced Pluripotent Stem Cells Generated With-
out Viral Integration, 322 SCIENCE 945 (2008).
12 See Keisuke Okita et al., Generation of Mouse Induced Pluripotent Stem
Cells Without Viral Vectors, 322 SCIENCE 949, 950-52 (2008); Knut Woltjen et al.,
PiggyBac Transposition Reprograms Fibroblasts to Induced Pluripotent Stem Cells,
458 NATURE 766 (2009) (demonstrating "successful and efficient reprogramming of
murine and human embryonic fibroblasts"); Keisuke Kaji et al., Virus-free Induction
of Pluripotency and Subsequent Excision of Reprogramming Factors, 458 NATURE
771,771 (2009).
" Danwei Huangfu et al., Induction of Pluripotent Stem Cells from Primary
Human Fibroblasts with Only Oct4 and Sox2, 26 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 1269,
1269 (2008).
14 Nathan J. Robertson et al., Embryonic Stem Cell-derived Tissues are Im-
munogenic but Their Inherent Immune Privilege Promotes the Induction of Toler-
ance, 104 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. Sci. U.S. 20920, 20920 (2007).
15 CHRISTOPHER THOMAS SCOTT, STEM CELL Now 124 (2006).
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The threshold question, therefore, is whether an embryo or fetus is
a human being. If so, at what point in development does the emb-
ryo/fetus achieve this status? Religion has often served as a founda-
tion to address this question. Nevertheless, even amongst specific
religious sects, the consensus has shifted over time.
Strict Catholics and other conservatives often recognize human
potentiality at an early stage. However, the Catholic position on this
matter has changed over time.1 Saint Thomas Aquinas (1225-1275
A.D.) believed that the human soul was not present at conception, but
that it appeared between forty and ninety days later. Yet, by 1987, the
Catholic Church had shifted its position by declaring that the embryo
was a person from the moment of conception.17 The Catholic Church
is not alone in its concern for the human potentiality of the embryo at
its early stages. In fact, many conservative scholars who do not
purport to base their views on religion such as Leon Kass, Daniel
Callahan, and Francis Fukuyama have expressed similar concerns. 8
Other perspectives do not recognize human potentiality so early in
the developmental process. A growing number of moderate Catholic
theologians do not consider the embryo an individual human entity
until the appearance of the primitive streak (nascent spinal cord) at
two weeks.19 The Jewish tradition asserts that embryos have no moral
status until they are implanted and survive forty days.20 Scientific
perspectives may focus on viability. Michael Gazzaniga points out
that the human brain cannot support vital functions until gestation has
reached six months - about the time at which a fetus could survive
premature birth in a hospital's neonatal unit.21 Interestingly, this is the
point at which the Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade22 begins to give the
fetus rights superior to those of the expectant mother.
16 See Elizabeth Spahn & Barbara Andrade, Mis-Conceptions: The Moment
of Conception in Religion, Science, and Law, 32 U.S.F. L. REv. 261, 269-73 (1998).
17 ScoT, supra note 15, at 130.
' See id at 137-39. Of these secular theorists who have addressed the topic,
we find, for example, Professor Jed Rudenfeld more convincing. He sees "where life
begins" as a political choice rather than an ethical decision. See Jed Rudenfeld, On the
Legal Status of the Proposition that "Life Begins at Conception," 43 STAN. L. REV.
599(1990).
19 ScoTT, supra note 15, at 131.
20 See id. at 133 (adding that Islam permits interventions in nature that will
further the greater good).
21 See MICHAEL S. GAZZANIGA, THE ETHICAL BRAIN 7 (2005).
22 410 U.S. 113, 164-65 (1973) (holding that "[flor the stage subsequent to
viability, the State in promoting its interest in the potentiality of human life may, if it
chooses, regulate, and even proscribe, abortion except where it is necessary . . . for
the preservation of the life or health of the mother.").
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Meanwhile, others do not pinpoint a particular time in develop-
ment but focus instead on a weighing of benefits and costs. Some
Catholic theologians embrace an ethical concept termed "proportio-
nate reason," which is akin to Utilitarianism. This approach tolerates
a lesser evil (killing the embryo now) in order to bring about a greater
good for society in the future (stem cell therapies). 23 However, pro-
ponents of "proportionate reason" seek to avoid embryo destruction
whenever possible;24 therefore, they would likely embrace Technique
D if it was proven to be as effective a therapy as is destroying an ex-
isting embryo for its stem cells.
Even if an embryo does have some sort of elevated status, perhaps
the crux of the matter is whether society allows the use of embryonic
stems cells to benefit future scientific discoveries, at the expense of
the embryo that must be destroyed. Ted Peters and Gaymon Bennett
argue that while we cannot be certain when an embryo becomes hu-
man, we can be certain about human suffering and that those who
suffer could benefit from discoveries made with embryonic stem
cells.25
Several scholars articulate a similar principle regarding sacrifice
for the greater good. For example, Laurie Zoloth, a professor of med-
ical ethics at Northwestern University notes that in the Jewish tradi-
tion "[i]f one can save a life, one must save a life; if one can heal, one
must heal."26 Thus, according to Zoloth, if healing is mandatory and
human embryonic stem cells can heal, they must be used. In a like
vein, James C. Peterson, a professor of ethics and theology, asks how
we can let people die to protect embryos that even if implanted may or
may not someday become persons. 27 On this score, a number of scho-
lars have pointed out that up to half of normally fertilized eggs never
implant, or if implanted, fail to develop.2 8
As to creating an embryo by SCNT cloning (Technique B) and
then extracting its stem cells, there is an abundance of literature, much
of it cautionary due to the possible use of the resulting embryo in hu-
23 See Michael M. Mendiola, Human Embryonic Stem Cells: Possible Ap-
proaches from a Catholic Perspective, in HUMAN EMBRYONIC STEM CELL DEBATE:
SCIENCE, ETHICS, & PUBLIC POLICY 119, 123-24 (Suzanne Holland et al. eds., 2001).
24 See id. at 124.
25 Ted Peters & Gaymon Bennett, Jr., Stem Cell Research and the Claim of
the Other in the Human Subject, 43 DIALOG: J. THEOLOGY 184, 201-02 (2004).
26 See SCOTr, supra note 15, at 132 (quoting Interview with Laurie Zoloth,
Professor of Medical Ethics, Northwestern University).
27 James C. Peterson, Is a Human Embryo a Human Being?, in GOD &
EMBRYO: RELIGIOUS VOICES ON STEM CELLS & CLONING 77, 85 (Brent Waters &
Ronald Cole-Turner eds., 2003).
28 SCoTT, supra note 15, at 135.
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man reproduction. 2 9 Nevertheless, harvested stem cells from cloned
patients have the enormous advantage of not causing rejection by that
patient's immune system. However, many worry that the embryo
clone could be used for reproductive purposes, rather than for thera-
py.3 0 Assuming proper regulation of embryonic cloning, we do not
believe that this concern overcomes the advantages of using cloned
embryos for therapy.
III. A FRAMEWORK FOR BIOETHICAL ANALYSIS
Against this scientific and ethical backdrop, what considerations
should dictate the use of particular ES-type cells? While science con-
tinues to make discoveries that may be of use to us, in each case,
should these discoveries be utilized? These questions can be ad-
dressed by framing the analysis based on three fundamental bioethical
approaches: (1) Utilitarian (weighing costs/harm versus benefits); (2)
Autonomistic (preserving/protecting individual liberty in decision-
making); and (3) Moralistic (deciding "rightness" or "wrongness"
based on moral imperatives).
A. Utilitarian Analysis
Under the Utilitarian approach, the one most generally adopted by
biomedical scientists, one first weighs the costs against the benefits of
a procedure and then decides on the basis of this calculus whether or
not it should be pursued. A ready example that relies on this approach
is the system of triage employed by medical professionals when their
resources are limited and they must decide how best to apply them.
(E.g., treating terminal injuries last.)
29 See, e.g., Leon R. Kass, The Wisdom of Repugnance: Why We Should Ban
the Cloning of Humans, 32 VAL. U. L. REv. 679 (1998); June Mary Zekan Makdisi,
The Slide from Human Embryonic Stem Cell Research to Reproductive Cloning:
Ethical Decision-Making and the Ban on Federal Funding, 34 RUTGERS L.J. 463
(2003); The President's Council on Bioethics, The Moral Case Against Cloning for
Biomedical Research, 18 ISSUEs L. & MED. 261, 272 (2003). In a more positive vein,
see, e.g., Ronald Chester, To Be, Be, Be. . . Not Just to Be: Legal and Social Implica-
tions of Cloning for Human Reproduction, 49 FLA. L. REV. 303 (1997); see generally
John A. Robertson, Why Human Reproductive Cloning Should Not in All Cases Be
Prohibited, 4 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. PoL'Y 35 (2000) (arguing that society should
permit human reproductive cloning as an alternative or supplement to services that
help families overcome infertility); see generally John A. Robertson, Liberty, Entity
and Human Cloning, 76 TEx. L. REV. 1371 (1998) (evaluating the public policy issues
surrounding the practice of human cloning).
30 See, e.g., Makdisi, supra note 29.
3 See, e.g., Chester, Cloning Embryos, supra note 3; Chester, Cloning for
Human Reproduction, supra, note 3.
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Utilitarian thinking is consequentialist thinking: one does not de-
termine whether the procedure should be pursued until one has deter-
mined the results of the cost/benefit calculus. Any Utilitarian analysis
must consider various factors. For example, when weighing costs
against benefits is each side weighed in the short-term, mid-term or
long-term? Would a large gain over the long-term outweigh a short-
term cost? Likewise, whose utility would we be measuring? One
might begin by weighing total social costs versus total social benefits,
but what if different segments of society bear the costs than those who
enjoy the benefits? These and similar questions bedevil even the most
Utilitarian of decision-makers. However, when measured rigorously
(often statistically) and weighed against one another, the costs and
benefits of a given procedure typically provide the most scientifically
sound decisions.
B. Human Dignity
Two other perspectives from which the question of "ought" can
be viewed, Autonomistic and Moralistic, each involve the concept of
human dignity and are deontological in nature: they attempt to tell us
what is ethical before we know the results of any Utilitarian calculus.
Deryck Beyleveld and Roger Brownsword view agency (the capabili-
ty of acting) as the basis of human dignity and thus note that human
beings ostensibly "only acquire rights at some time after birth."3 2
Nonetheless, "precautionary reasoning requires [the rest of us] to rec-
ognize duties to the unborn in proportion to the degree to which the
unborn display characteristics associated with the ability to display
agency." 33 To strike the proper balance, let us briefly consider the
two basic views of human dignity. 34
1. Autonomistic Viewpoint
The first approach is that of human rights as autonomy, which
emphasizes human choice and liberties. This Autonomistic viewpoint
stresses the inalienable rights of each individual. It applies directly
32 DERYCK BEYLEVELD & ROGER BROWNSWORD, HUMAN DIGNITY IN
BIOETHICS AND BIOLAW 157 (2001).
33 id.
34 See generally Roger Brownsword, Stem Cells and Cloning: Where the
Regulatory Consensus Fails, 39 NEw ENG. L. REV. 535 (2005) (explaining these two
views and Utilitarianism in relation to the issues involved in human cloning); Roger
Brownsword, Bioethics Today, Bioethics Tomorrow: Stem Cell Research and the
Dignitarian Alliance, 17 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. Pot'Y 18 (2003) (examin-
ing two accounts of human dignity in relation to the recent debate in the United
Kingdom over human embryonic stem cell research).
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only to those humans who have the capacity for autonomy (i.e.
possess "agency"). Thus understood, it generally allows competent
decision-makers such as patients, doctors and researchers to make
their own choices. The intersection of these choices would be what
lawyers understand as contract.
For example, a legally competent patient could make whatever
"deal" he or she wishes with a doctor as long as this bargain does not
harm others and such a bargain would be viewed as ethical.3 ' The
beauty of this approach, as contrasted with that of the Moralists, is
that we do not have to prejudge whether a particular bargain fits into
our own personal view of what is right and what is wrong. It is pre-
sumptively ethical. No external authority constrains such bargains.
The basic issue this approach presents for stem cell research is wheth-
er one should consider the unborn as "others" who must not be
harmed by the bargain, even though these unborn do not display
agency.
2. Moralist Viewpoint
Moralist positions also derive conceptually from human rights, yet
they generally limit the application of stem cell techniques rather than
enabling them. Such views are generally dominated by firm convic-
tions regarding "human dignity" which their adherents are willing to
impose on the analysis, regardless of what freely contracting individu-
als might desire, or that which is dictated by strict cost/benefit analy-
*36
sis.,
Although it can be called a human rights approach, the Moralistic
view is really about others telling us what our human rights are, rather
than about competent individuals making their own decisions about
this (so long as they do not harm others). The Moralistic view has
largely determined the distribution of US federal monies for stem cell
research for nearly a decade.
35 Beyleveld and Brownsword argue that there must be a good reason for
restricting (or failing to support) choices made by contractors. "If we practise what
we preach, contractors will enjoy freedom in two spheres - the relation to their choice
of contractual projects, purposes, and particular terms (term freedom) and in relation
to their co-contractors (partner freedom)." BEYLEVELD & BROWNSWORD, supra note
32, at 212. Still, Beyleveld and Brownsword argue that contractors' freedom must be
restricted to some extent by the rights of third parties and their human dignity. Id.
36 See, e.g., Kass, supra note 29, at 689 ("[The ethical judgment on cloning
can no longer be reduced to a matter of motives and intentions, rights and freedoms,
benefits and harms, or even means and ends. It must be regarded primarily as a mat-
ter of meaning: Is cloning a fulfillment of human begetting and belonging?" Kass
thinks not.).
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IV. HOW THE THREE BIOETHICAL APPROACHES
MIGHT BE APPLIED TO STEM CELL PROCEDURES
These three bioethical approaches might apply to the stem cell
techniques outlined above in the following ways:
A. Utilitarian Cost/Benefit Analysis
The potential benefits of stem cell research in treating disease are
apparent to most biomedical scientists. On the cost or "harm" side of
the equation, some thinkers might include procedures that undermine
human rights. However, if factors such as destruction of the embryo
are not included or at least are not weighted heavily as a cost, the
main consideration under cost/benefit analysis is that of the safety of a
given procedure. For example, the use of iPS cells (Technique D) in
therapy, while it would seem to eliminate many concerns of the Mo-
ralists regarding destruction of an embryo, could be questioned under
the Utilitarian calculus because of the threat of inducing cancer in the
patient. Though avoidance of viral integration and of known carcino-
genic transcription factors (e.g., c-Myc) certainly improve the safety
profile of this technique, the epigenetic and transcriptional repro-
gramming that promotes the iPS state could alone predispose the cell
to malignant transformation.
B. Autonomistic Analysis
Under the Autonomistic view, stem cell therapeutics of any type
should be pursued if a legally competent person or persons want it and
it does not harm others. Let us first consider a bargain between legal-
ly competent individuals that affects an embryo. Clearly the embryo
itself is not a legally competent individual capable of making its own
bargains. Still, at some point in its development, harm to it must be
taken account of by the Autonomistic perspective: it becomes an "oth-
er" to which respect must be paid. "The autonomous choices of the
researcher [for example to create, test, manipulate and store embryos]
and of women [to terminate pregnancies] must be measured by their
legitimacy"3 7 with regard to their respect for human dignity.
Take for example the question of abortion under Roe v. Wade.
For the first three months of pregnancy, the rights of the embryo/fetus
3 BEYLEVELD & BROWNSWORD, supra note 32, at 32-33.
3 410 U.S. 113 (1973). It should be noted that the subsequent case of
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992),
modified the strict trimester approach by using the more elastic fetal viability ap-
proach. Since the principles underlying these approaches are similar, we will use Roe
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are given no credence; for the second three months, they are balanced
against the rights of the mother; and for the final three, coinciding
roughly with the period in which a fetus can survive outside the
womb, the rights of the fetus become predominant. Thus the contract
between doctor and patient is subject to greater and greater limitations
as the embryo/fetus develops. Further, these limitations are not simp-
ly imposed because of the rights of third parties who may be legally
competent.
When assessing "harm to others" as a limitation on free contract,
one should note that as development proceeds in the womb, the law as
expressed in Roe 9 increasingly regards "others" as including the fe-
tus, and perhaps shortly after birth, the young "non-agent" child.
Even at these later stages of development children are not legally
competent to make free choices themselves. However, we all recog-
nize that even a freely-bargained "deal" to kill a two-week old child
would be prohibited.
One observation that can be made from considering these matters
is that anyone who agrees with the Roe analysis should have little
problem with destroying an embryo or fetus up to three months old.
Neither is such an entity "viable" under Planned Parenthood. Since
stem cell research is concerned primarily with blastocysts at the 4 or 5
day stage, the rights of the fetus at some later stage should be of no
concern to stem cell research.
Still many do not agree with the ideas expressed in Roe v. Wade.40
Some specific ethical questions of "embryo empowerment" arise with
the destruction of an existing embryo (Technique A) and of an emb-
ryo created by SCNT.4 1 However, an embryo is not a legally compe-
tent person capable of entering the bargains that a human rights view,
stressing individual autonomy, would allow. The only way the emb-
ryo might enter such bargains would be through an agent like a guar-
dian. In the United States, attempts by Moralists to have such agents
appointed have been stymied by the lack of settled law defining the
embryo as a person. In general, only persons can have legal guar-
dians. Technique C - parthenogenesis - is immune from even these
potential problems because it cannot yield an embryo capable of fetal
development without further genetic manipulation. Technique D can
be freely employed by consenting adults because it involves no emb-
ryo.
in the analysis for ease of expression.
3 See generally Roe, 410 U.S. 113.
40 id
41 Chester, Cloning Embryos, supra note 3.
HEAL TH MA TRIX214 [Vol. 20:203
EMBRYONIC STEM CELL-BASED THERAPEUTICS
C. Moralistic Analysis
This approach, which seeks to prevent stem cell research where an
embryo is involved, can be quickly understood by examining the
French Dwarf-throwing case that went before the Conseil d'Etat in the
mid- 1990s. 4 2 Although the dwarfs in question wanted to be hurled in
exhibitions so that they could make a living (human rights as autono-
my view), it was ultimately decided that this was an affront to human
dignity and the practice was banned. Here the same Moralistic view
that would protect a non-viable embryo, trumped the Autonomistic
human rights position, even though the dwarfs in question were, un-
like the embryos, legally competent agents.
Much the same issue arises with the situation regarding women
wishing to carry another's child in exchange for money. In the United
States, the law on such surrogacy is both tangled and inconsistent be-
cause of sharply conflicting bioethical positions. Under the Moralistic
view, such an exchange would be an affront to the human dignity of
the woman offering her womb for a price. The Autonomistic position
would, by contrast, stress the right of a legally competent woman to
make her own free bargains. This example also exposes a striking
paradox within the Moralistic perspective: while such an embryo
could not be used for stem cell research because it is deemed "viable,"
that same embryo is actually denied viability by forbidding its implan-
tation in the womb of a surrogate.
Finally, it should be noted that Moralists appear quite concerned
with what is or is not "human." The assumption is that humans are
special animals and that their dignity, unlike that of other animals,
cannot be compromised. In support of this view it is certainly true
that while other animals can become highly adapted to a particular
environment, they cannot, unlike humans adapt simultaneously to
many different environments. Whether this and other factors argue
for a uniqueness in humans that should be especially protected is a
topic for another day.
Under the Moralistic perspective, both Techniques A and B would
be banned because embryos capable of being implanted and develop-
ing into human beings should not, because of their human potential,
be destroyed for their stem cells. Parthenogenesis (Technique C)
would be viewed as an affront to human dignity because: (1) of the
need to procure oocytes from a healthy female (generally for a price);
(2) of the belief that the whole process is "inhuman" due to its asexual
42 Conseil d'Etat (October 27, 1995) req. nos. 136-727 (Connune de Mor-
sang-sur-Orange) and 143-578 (Ville d'Aix-en-Provence).
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nature; and (3) further manipulation of the parthenote might produce
an implantable embryo that could become a human being. This leaves
open the important question of whether Moralists would support the
use of Technique D, which bypasses use of fetal tissue by genetically
engineering the requisite cell phenotype.
While it might be assumed that Moralists would not object to
Technique D, some in their number may still view such techniques
contentiously because the cell manipulation(s) may connote defying
nature (or "playing God"). Moreover, though iPS cells lack totipoten-
cy," the mounting information about the molecules that bind to a pro-
tein to regulate the role of that protein in embryogenesis could con-
ceivably lead to the creation of more primitive embryonic phenotypes
from iPS cells, which in turn raises the prospect of reproductive clon-
ing." Of course, Utilitarians could treat this, as well as other potential
moral problems in stem cell procurement, not as absolutes leading to
prohibition, but rather as costs to be weighed against possible benefits
of the procedure.
CONCLUSION
The goals of biomedical scientists, physicians and other biomedi-
cal decision-makers are clearly aligned on the purpose of advancing
new therapeutics to alleviate human suffering, and this mission criti-
cally depends on achieving relevant moral/ethical consensus for any
emerging medical therapy. Thus, appropriately, biomedical advances
are intermeshed with bioethical debate.
The framework of bioethical principles outlined herein is clearly
preliminary. However, we think it sufficiently detailed to prompt
communication among biomedical scientists and medical decision-
makers evaluating innovations in deriving ES-type cells. The applica-
tion of these principles will enable constructive and practical
discussion, which should ultimately improve judgments made by
health care providers regarding ESC-based regenerative therapeutics.
In general, biomedical scientists should take into account, within
the Utilitarian cost/benefit analysis, how the knowledge gained from
stem cell research impacts concepts of human dignity. Conversely,
43 The capability of developing into a complete organism or differentiating
into any of its cells or tissues.
4 See generally Chester, Cloning Embryos, supra note 3 (suggesting that
once the cloning of embryos becomes widely accepted, the use of such clones for
reproduction is essentially inevitable and that lawmakers should not attempt to ban
the use of cloning for reproduction while at the same time permitting its use for thera-
py and research).
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biomedical decision-makers should be cautious about relying too
heavily on the Moralistic approach in assessing developments in stem
cell therapeutics insofar as this approach constrains the scientific cal-
culation of the risks and benefits of any given technology or proce-
dure and the free choice(s) of the individuals involved. We believe
that Moralist positions are best utilized not in an absolutist way, but
by considering them as "costs" in Utilitarian calculations or as "harm
to others" when assessed from Autonomistic perspectives. Thus, Mo-
ralist positions would not, alone, prejudge the ethicality of a particular
procedure, but would be weighed against other values, in the determi-
nation under the Utilitarian and Autonomistic approaches of whether a
given procedure ought to be utilized.

